http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/
"Our terms of reference are very broad, but the essential points, as set out by the Prime Minister and agreed by the House of Commons, are that this is an Inquiry by a committee of Privy Counsellors. It will consider the period from the summer of 2001 to the end of July 2009, embracing the run-up to the conflict in Iraq, the military action and its aftermath. We will therefore be considering the UK’s involvement in Iraq, including the way decisions were made and actions taken, to establish, as accurately as possible, what happened and to identify the lessons that can be learned. Those lessons will help ensure that, if we face similar situations in future, the government of the day is best equipped to respond to those situations in the most effective manner in the best interests of the country."
Sir John Chilcot
Chairman
The Iraq Inquiry
30th July 2009
Why is there going to be an Inquiry?
As the Prime Minister explained to the House of Commons on 15 June 2009, the purpose of the Inquiry is to identify lessons that can be learned from the Iraq conflict.
What is its remit/terms of reference?
The Inquiry has been asked to consider the period from summer 2001, before military operations began in March 2003, and the UK’s subsequent involvement in Iraq up to the end of July 2009. The Prime Minister told the House of Commons: “the Iraq Inquiry will look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction.” The objective is to learn the lessons from the events surrounding the conflict.
Who are the members of the Inquiry Committee?
Sir John Chilcot (Chairman), Sir Lawrence Freedman, Sir Martin Gilbert, Sir Roderic Lyne, and Baroness Usha Prashar.
Who picked the members?
The Prime Minister appointed the members of the Committee. Opposition parties were consulted.
Why don’t you have politicians on the Inquiry team?
The Committee’s membership is a matter for the Government. Sir John has, however, discussed his approach to the Inquiry with the Government, leaders of Opposition parties, Chairmen of relevant House of Commons Committees and other interested Parliamentarians. The Committee will continue to discuss the Inquiry with politicians as the Inquiry progresses.
What experts does the Inquiry have to assist it, and what experience do they have?
The Committee intends to take advice from specialist advisers with expertise in international law, military operations and post-conflict reconstruction.
Will the Inquiry say whether anybody involved in the Iraq conflict should face criminal charges?
Will it be able to apportion blame?
The Inquiry is not a court of law. The members of the Committee are not judges, and nobody is on trial. But if the Committee find that mistakes were made, that there were issues which could have been dealt with better, it will say so.
What difference will the Inquiry make?
The Inquiry will provide a reliable account of events that will help identify lessons to guide future foreign policy decision-making and decisions regarding conflict and post-conflict situations.
Why is the Inquiry being held now?
Governments decide the timings of inquiries. The Government had repeatedly said that an Inquiry should be held once combat troops had left Iraq so as not to undermine their role there. Combat troops have now withdrawn and the Government has judged this is now the right time to begin an Inquiry.
When will the Inquiry start taking evidence?
Evidence from witnesses will begin being heard in autumn 2009. Before then the Committee will be examining an extensive amount of Government papers and other written material.
Will records of proceedings be available on the Inquiry website?
The Inquiry team intends to make records of the public evidence sessions available on the website.
Will all the documentary evidence be published on the website?
The Committee intends to publish the key evidence with its report at the end of the Inquiry. It may also publish material on the website as the Inquiry progresses where this will help increase public understanding of its ongoing work.
Can members of the public and media attend hearings?
Yes, there will be seats both for the media and the public for the public evidence sessions.
What are the rules surrounding public attendance?
Members of the public will be asked to follow certain standards of behaviour, similar to those in a courtroom, although this is not a judicial inquiry. A leaflet will be given to anyone entering the hearing centre outlining these standards.
What facilities will be available for the media?
The Inquiry team will provide details in due course. Hearings will not begin until later this year.
Will the Inquiry proceedings be televised?
The Committee wants to ensure that as many people as possible have access to what is happening in the public hearings, either direct or through the media. That includes the possibility of public hearings being televised and live streaming on the internet.
When and how will the report be published?
The Committee members intend to complete their task as quickly as possible but cannot know how long the Inquiry will take until they have read the background material and heard the evidence. The Prime Minister in his statement of 15 June said that he wanted the Committee to publish its report as fully as possible, disclosing all but the most sensitive information essential to our national security. It will be published as a Parliamentary paper and debated in both Houses of Parliament.
Will it be available on the internet?
Yes.
Will all the written and oral evidence be published in the report?
It is the Committee’s intention to publish all the relevant evidence except where national security considerations prevent that.
Will there be an interim report?
If, as the Committee work through the evidence, it considers that it would be helpful to publish an interim report, it will do so. But it is more likely, given the purpose of the Inquiry – identifying lessons for the way government acts and takes decisions in the future - that its report will be a single one at the end of the Committee’s deliberations.
Will the Committee finish before the next General Election, June at the latest? (Very latest possible date, June 2010)
No. The amount of evidence to be examined and analysed means that to ensure the Inquiry is comprehensive and rigorous it will not be possible to finish before June 2010.
Have any witnesses been granted anonymity for this Inquiry?
So far, no-one has been identified as a witness. There may be a small number of people whom the Inquiry decides it would be inappropriate to identify.
How much of the evidence will be given in private?
Sir John Chilcot has made clear his desire for as much as possible of the proceedings to be held in public, consistent with the need to protect national security and ensure that the terms of reference are fulfilled to the fullest extent.
How will the Inquiry decide whether evidence should be given in private?
The Committee’s guiding principle is to establish a reliable account of what happened. The treatment of witnesses will be determined, on a case by case basis, by its best judgement on how to do that.
Whom will the Inquiry call to give evidence?
The people the Committee invites to give evidence will be those it judges, having considered the material before it, are best placed to supply the information it needs to conduct its task thoroughly. As the Inquiry progresses it will become clear to whom it needs to speak.
Will names of witnesses be provided in advance?
The Inquiry will publish on its website a timetable for forthcoming public hearing sessions.
How is the Government cooperating with the Inquiry?
As the Prime Minister told the House, the Inquiry can ask for any document and no UK witness will be beyond the scope of the Inquiry. The Government has assured the Inquiry of the full cooperation of the relevant Departments.
Will the Inquiry look into issues that are being considered by other proceedings outside this Inquiry?
There may be issues that are subject to other ongoing proceedings – for example, legal proceedings or police investigations - on which it would not be appropriate for this Inquiry to comment. We will decide this on a case-by-case basis, and subject to legal advice.
Does the inquiry have a Freedom of Information policy?
The Inquiry, itself, is not a public authority for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act, so the Act does not apply. However, in addition to its hearings being open to the public and the media wherever possible, the Inquiry's website will contain transcripts of public hearings and other key information relating to the work of the Inquiry.
How much will the Inquiry cost/how much is the budget?
The Government has assured the Committee that it will have the resources it needs to do its job properly. At the same time, it is determined to ensure that it runs the Inquiry efficiently and does not waste public money.
Tuesday, 18 August 2009
Sunday, 2 August 2009
Sunday 2 August - Commentary
The inquiry is some way off, but the commentators are filling up the column inches. Here's the pick of the day:
Mail on Sunday: reckons the Iraq inquiry will look again at the death of Dr David Kelly. I hope otherwise - the death of Dr Kelly is a matter for a proper inquest, including the unanswered questions in the wake of Hutton.
The Sunday Telegraph: Matthew d'Ancona reckons Blair will slither away unscathed based on his Hutton performance. I hope otherwise - most commentators would probably agree that Blair's evidence was not tested and that Hutton steered clear of many of the matters that Chilcott should be considering. There's more evidence out there now than then, and Blair no longer poses the awkward constitutional position of being prime minister, as he did at the time of Hutton.
Plenty of commentary and the inquiry hasn't even started properly! Long may it continue....
Mail on Sunday: reckons the Iraq inquiry will look again at the death of Dr David Kelly. I hope otherwise - the death of Dr Kelly is a matter for a proper inquest, including the unanswered questions in the wake of Hutton.
The Sunday Telegraph: Matthew d'Ancona reckons Blair will slither away unscathed based on his Hutton performance. I hope otherwise - most commentators would probably agree that Blair's evidence was not tested and that Hutton steered clear of many of the matters that Chilcott should be considering. There's more evidence out there now than then, and Blair no longer poses the awkward constitutional position of being prime minister, as he did at the time of Hutton.
Plenty of commentary and the inquiry hasn't even started properly! Long may it continue....
Thursday, 30 July 2009
Scope of Inquiry
Sir John Chilcot's press conference ongoing.
From what he has said so far, and at first glance, it looks thorough enough to make certain parties nervous.
- It may be televised
- Blair (and others) will be called
- Military and legal advisers will be named later
- The committee will not shy away from making criticisms
The line of questioning of the media may well set the agenda for commentary: if so, the focus is very much on the decision to go to war, the role of Blair and the cabinet, political decision-making ("absolutely central" to the inquiry), the legal advice.
This will make a very uncomfortable time for the government - unless there is a willingness to try and draw a line under the Iraq War, to enable the Labour party to make a clean break from the past, without any further accusations of whitewash.
The conclusions may also be drawn up for a Conservative government and a Conservative dominated parliament, with a very different Labour party in opposition. The inquiry may well just be the start of the difficulties of Blair and others....
This all assumes that Chilcot's promises of openness are not a temporary ruse and that most of the inquiry does not go on behind closed doors and avoids the critical questions....but I don't think the media and public will stand for that. Every closed door will generate a headline, now that the expectation is of openness.
From what he has said so far, and at first glance, it looks thorough enough to make certain parties nervous.
- It may be televised
- Blair (and others) will be called
- Military and legal advisers will be named later
- The committee will not shy away from making criticisms
The line of questioning of the media may well set the agenda for commentary: if so, the focus is very much on the decision to go to war, the role of Blair and the cabinet, political decision-making ("absolutely central" to the inquiry), the legal advice.
This will make a very uncomfortable time for the government - unless there is a willingness to try and draw a line under the Iraq War, to enable the Labour party to make a clean break from the past, without any further accusations of whitewash.
The conclusions may also be drawn up for a Conservative government and a Conservative dominated parliament, with a very different Labour party in opposition. The inquiry may well just be the start of the difficulties of Blair and others....
This all assumes that Chilcot's promises of openness are not a temporary ruse and that most of the inquiry does not go on behind closed doors and avoids the critical questions....but I don't think the media and public will stand for that. Every closed door will generate a headline, now that the expectation is of openness.
Friday, 26 June 2009
Kampfner in Specator - Essential Reading
John Kampfner unveils the ignominious truth about Sir John Chilcot’s Iraq inquiry and reveals Peter Mandelson’s demand, when Brown’s future hung in the balance in early June, that the hearings be held in private. Even now Mandelson’s priority is to protect Brand Blair.
Fast forward to June 2009: with his own back to the wall, Brown turned to the same forces that had on more than one occasion helped save Blair — Mandelson and Campbell. Mandelson’s vital role in the period between the local elections and the Monday after the announcement of the European results is well documented. In return for securing the loyalty of wavering Cabinet ministers, the prince of darkness secured his 30-word job title, one of the largest departments in Whitehall history and confirmation of his status as the number two in government. Not known until now is one vital part of their negotiation. Mandelson — on Blair’s behalf — set down specific conditions for the Iraq war inquiry. The deal, I am told, was explicit. Not only would the hearings be fully in private, but the committee would, as with Hutton, be manageable. Brown was instructed to ensure that the members of the inquiry would, in the words of one official, ‘not stir the horses’. Brown readily acquiesced. He was not in a position to do anything else. It was a done deal, even before James Purnell sent alarm bells through Downing Street with his resignation on the night of 4 June.
Brown, Blair and Mandelson were quite prepared for the fury of the anti-war brigade, the Guardianistas, as people like myself are referred to. The New Labour project was, after all, conceived on the idea of embracing important figures on the right and discarding people on the liberal left who care about issues such as civil liberties and ethics in foreign policy. They were surprised, however, by the number of great and good in Whitehall and the armed forces who denounced the idea of an inquiry in private. A number of figures in Downing Street, the Foreign Office and the Cabinet were unhappy with this arrangement. Ed Balls, for long Brown’s closest confidant but hardly a soulmate of Mandelson’s, was one of the first to express his misgivings in public. David Miliband accepted the terms, but was not altogether pleased.
Brown and Mandelson should have anticipated the concern of the military top brass. Many of these figures have long been furious about the government’s approach to Iraq. I saw this for myself, in microcosm, in the autumn of 2003. I was visiting an officers’ college, as part of my book promotional tour. I decided to tone down my standard introductory remarks in order not to come across as offensive and unpatriotic. I completely misread my audience. They were vituperative, under the cloak of ‘Chatham House rules’, about Blair’s massaging of the intelligence, about the lack of military preparedness, the lack of planning for the occupation, amid a general sense that soldiers were being sent to die for party political gain. That is the message Blair has been desperate to avoid being aired in public.
Essential reading, particularly the last bit in bold. An attempt at a closed-doors stitch up, which has been derailed because of massive Establishment and Armed Forces anger. There are plenty of people with stories to tell...
In the vein of John Kampfner's post, here is my own observation. In late 2003 I ran a small discussion workshop (part of instructional techniques training) and the participants were a fairly mixed but representative bunch of personnel although all of us were of modest rank. My discussion was on the theme of Iraq - did the war meet the tests of legality, morality and national interest. It was a very good discussion, never make the mistake of assuming that the Armed Forces have a neutral political opinion (as Churchill did in 1945) and I was surprised by the outcome. Only a narrow majority (by show of hands) expressed the view that the war was justified - even in late 2003! The substance of the discussion was very interesting, as most personnel were drawing on their experiences or knowledge of the Balkans and the consequences that had arisen from UN and international inaction. This was only a one-off workshop, but I think it represents a striking truth - where there was support for Iraq, this was largely based on historical viewpoints of action versus appeasement (I suspect that the long shadow of WW2 featured in many minds) rather than any conviction of a real threat from Iraq, Saddam Hussein or WMDs. Given that mindset, I am not surprised of an enormous backlash from those who were in uniform at the time, following the lack of WMDs, the lives lost, and the well-known equipment and funding failures.
Here's a snippet I heard that shows Blair at work. An esteemed senior officer I know was briefing Blair on the air defence network in the wake of September 11 2001. Apparently it was SOP (standard operational procedure) for Blair to simply get up and walk out with his advisers when he had heard enough from such experts, without any courtesies...presumably a New Labour tactic of putting people firmly in their box.
Fast forward to June 2009: with his own back to the wall, Brown turned to the same forces that had on more than one occasion helped save Blair — Mandelson and Campbell. Mandelson’s vital role in the period between the local elections and the Monday after the announcement of the European results is well documented. In return for securing the loyalty of wavering Cabinet ministers, the prince of darkness secured his 30-word job title, one of the largest departments in Whitehall history and confirmation of his status as the number two in government. Not known until now is one vital part of their negotiation. Mandelson — on Blair’s behalf — set down specific conditions for the Iraq war inquiry. The deal, I am told, was explicit. Not only would the hearings be fully in private, but the committee would, as with Hutton, be manageable. Brown was instructed to ensure that the members of the inquiry would, in the words of one official, ‘not stir the horses’. Brown readily acquiesced. He was not in a position to do anything else. It was a done deal, even before James Purnell sent alarm bells through Downing Street with his resignation on the night of 4 June.
Brown, Blair and Mandelson were quite prepared for the fury of the anti-war brigade, the Guardianistas, as people like myself are referred to. The New Labour project was, after all, conceived on the idea of embracing important figures on the right and discarding people on the liberal left who care about issues such as civil liberties and ethics in foreign policy. They were surprised, however, by the number of great and good in Whitehall and the armed forces who denounced the idea of an inquiry in private. A number of figures in Downing Street, the Foreign Office and the Cabinet were unhappy with this arrangement. Ed Balls, for long Brown’s closest confidant but hardly a soulmate of Mandelson’s, was one of the first to express his misgivings in public. David Miliband accepted the terms, but was not altogether pleased.
Brown and Mandelson should have anticipated the concern of the military top brass. Many of these figures have long been furious about the government’s approach to Iraq. I saw this for myself, in microcosm, in the autumn of 2003. I was visiting an officers’ college, as part of my book promotional tour. I decided to tone down my standard introductory remarks in order not to come across as offensive and unpatriotic. I completely misread my audience. They were vituperative, under the cloak of ‘Chatham House rules’, about Blair’s massaging of the intelligence, about the lack of military preparedness, the lack of planning for the occupation, amid a general sense that soldiers were being sent to die for party political gain. That is the message Blair has been desperate to avoid being aired in public.
Essential reading, particularly the last bit in bold. An attempt at a closed-doors stitch up, which has been derailed because of massive Establishment and Armed Forces anger. There are plenty of people with stories to tell...
In the vein of John Kampfner's post, here is my own observation. In late 2003 I ran a small discussion workshop (part of instructional techniques training) and the participants were a fairly mixed but representative bunch of personnel although all of us were of modest rank. My discussion was on the theme of Iraq - did the war meet the tests of legality, morality and national interest. It was a very good discussion, never make the mistake of assuming that the Armed Forces have a neutral political opinion (as Churchill did in 1945) and I was surprised by the outcome. Only a narrow majority (by show of hands) expressed the view that the war was justified - even in late 2003! The substance of the discussion was very interesting, as most personnel were drawing on their experiences or knowledge of the Balkans and the consequences that had arisen from UN and international inaction. This was only a one-off workshop, but I think it represents a striking truth - where there was support for Iraq, this was largely based on historical viewpoints of action versus appeasement (I suspect that the long shadow of WW2 featured in many minds) rather than any conviction of a real threat from Iraq, Saddam Hussein or WMDs. Given that mindset, I am not surprised of an enormous backlash from those who were in uniform at the time, following the lack of WMDs, the lives lost, and the well-known equipment and funding failures.
Here's a snippet I heard that shows Blair at work. An esteemed senior officer I know was briefing Blair on the air defence network in the wake of September 11 2001. Apparently it was SOP (standard operational procedure) for Blair to simply get up and walk out with his advisers when he had heard enough from such experts, without any courtesies...presumably a New Labour tactic of putting people firmly in their box.
Tuesday, 23 June 2009
Iraq Inquiry - Remit and Format
A lot has happened over the last few days that indicates how the inquiry may be shaping up. We have a Parliamentary debate tomorrow which may well provide the catalyst for the final crystallisation of the inquiry remit and format.
As we know, both Blair and Campbell have tried to wriggle out of public accountability by lobbying for the inquiry to be held in private, as Brown initially stated. As we know, there has been an enormous backlash from generals and air marshals, the lords Butler and Hutton of the eponymous inquiries, politicians of all parties (including from the Labour benches) as well as the public at large.
Brown has backed down (although he should not be criticised for backing down as this is a welcome development) and the chair of the inquiry, Sir John Chilcot, has indicated that the majority of the inquiry will be public and that Blair will be expected to give evidence in public. Chilcot has also indicated that he will seek military expertise as part of the inquiry and that he will consult with the leaders of the opposition parties – David Cameron and Nick Clegg.
So far, so good. The importance of this inquiry cannot be overstated. There is an element of self-interest as well: Labour – and this current government – will forever be tarnished by the stain of Iraq unless its legacy is a full and transparent public inquiry which leaves no stone unturned. I personally would be deeply grateful to Brown if this was his legacy, which could heal many divisions and restore the reputation of his party and government.
However, more work and more pressure is required. A public inquiry is not necessarily a robust inquiry. It depends on the remit and the format.
The remit as it stands does not cover a long enough period: the inquiry needs to consider the period as far back as the first Gulf War of 1990 and the ceasefire resolution, as well as Op Desert Fox of 1998. The entire events of this period do not need detailed consideration but the inquiry would need to look specifically at weapons inspection, sanction monitoring and intelligence assessments.
The format must be inquisitorial with cross-examination and legal counsel for witnesses. Hutton is a good model for an inquiry, but the death of Dr Kelly was far more clear-cut with counsel for the government and counsel for the Kelly family. An Iraq inquiry would be more difficult to organise along these lines but not impossible. Two rounds of hearings could take place, the first to establish a narrative with points of contention and dispute and the second to allow cross-examination on these points of contention, probably with a case “for” the government and a case “against” the government with multiple representations made through a single barrister. I’m not a lawyer but I’ve been through inquiries and hearings and it is perfectly possible to structure an inquiry with informal hearing sessions (the first stage) and formal inquiry sessions under oath with counsel (the second stage). There’s the issue of whether evidence is under oath, but as this is a non-judicial inquiry that is not likely. However, I suppose a judicial inquiry could follow under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, the format of this inquiry must be robust – presumably Blair and Campbell are hoping to be questioned by Sir David Frost or Andrew Marr.
There would be very little dispute over closed sessions where this was required for critical issues of operational effectiveness or classified intelligence. However, I sense a possible government get-out clause. Most intelligence relating to Iraq from 2002 and 2003 would be UK-US Eyes Only, normally secret or top secret with additional restrictive caveats. There are protocols for sharing of intelligence between the UK and US as well as protocols for critically sensitive intelligence. The normal protocol is that shared intelligence will not be disclosed without the permission of the originator, and I do not believe that the US will allow disclosure of supplied intelligence even to an inquiry with evidence sessions behind closed doors. It is worth checking Butler, to see what was released to that inquiry, but the pattern of US co-operation with inquiries and inquests has been lamentable. It is tempting to believe that the situation may be slightly different now – seven years after the war and with an Obama administration – but I doubt it, as the culture of government secrecy always remains. So it may be very difficult to scrutinise intelligence where release is not authorised. However, it will be possible to hear evidence from intelligence and military personnel who played a role in such matter, even if the primary material is not released. These sessions may well need to be behind closed doors, but a case needs to be made to justify it. Also, by reviewing the Hutton and Butler material, some time can be saved – although there have been subsequent leaks and disclosures since these two inquiries, and these leaks are likely to continue. Another reason for closing the doors will be on issues of military operational effectiveness and personnel security – special forces personnel, details of precise equipment capabilities and operational tactics. I think these would be very limited to a few specific situations and scenarios, mainly relating to special forces operations and tactics and precise details of equipment capabilities and limitations. These should be very limited. Nevertheless, it is vital to get the issue out on the table at the start to avoid being bounced into a cover-up when it is too late.
I hope that the debate tomorrow will cover all these issues. I think – eventually – we will get the inquiry that is needed and there is the will on all sides to see it through, despite vested interests. Thankfully those vested interests are largely without power or influence and a whitewash is hopefully beyond their grasp.
As we know, both Blair and Campbell have tried to wriggle out of public accountability by lobbying for the inquiry to be held in private, as Brown initially stated. As we know, there has been an enormous backlash from generals and air marshals, the lords Butler and Hutton of the eponymous inquiries, politicians of all parties (including from the Labour benches) as well as the public at large.
Brown has backed down (although he should not be criticised for backing down as this is a welcome development) and the chair of the inquiry, Sir John Chilcot, has indicated that the majority of the inquiry will be public and that Blair will be expected to give evidence in public. Chilcot has also indicated that he will seek military expertise as part of the inquiry and that he will consult with the leaders of the opposition parties – David Cameron and Nick Clegg.
So far, so good. The importance of this inquiry cannot be overstated. There is an element of self-interest as well: Labour – and this current government – will forever be tarnished by the stain of Iraq unless its legacy is a full and transparent public inquiry which leaves no stone unturned. I personally would be deeply grateful to Brown if this was his legacy, which could heal many divisions and restore the reputation of his party and government.
However, more work and more pressure is required. A public inquiry is not necessarily a robust inquiry. It depends on the remit and the format.
The remit as it stands does not cover a long enough period: the inquiry needs to consider the period as far back as the first Gulf War of 1990 and the ceasefire resolution, as well as Op Desert Fox of 1998. The entire events of this period do not need detailed consideration but the inquiry would need to look specifically at weapons inspection, sanction monitoring and intelligence assessments.
The format must be inquisitorial with cross-examination and legal counsel for witnesses. Hutton is a good model for an inquiry, but the death of Dr Kelly was far more clear-cut with counsel for the government and counsel for the Kelly family. An Iraq inquiry would be more difficult to organise along these lines but not impossible. Two rounds of hearings could take place, the first to establish a narrative with points of contention and dispute and the second to allow cross-examination on these points of contention, probably with a case “for” the government and a case “against” the government with multiple representations made through a single barrister. I’m not a lawyer but I’ve been through inquiries and hearings and it is perfectly possible to structure an inquiry with informal hearing sessions (the first stage) and formal inquiry sessions under oath with counsel (the second stage). There’s the issue of whether evidence is under oath, but as this is a non-judicial inquiry that is not likely. However, I suppose a judicial inquiry could follow under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, the format of this inquiry must be robust – presumably Blair and Campbell are hoping to be questioned by Sir David Frost or Andrew Marr.
There would be very little dispute over closed sessions where this was required for critical issues of operational effectiveness or classified intelligence. However, I sense a possible government get-out clause. Most intelligence relating to Iraq from 2002 and 2003 would be UK-US Eyes Only, normally secret or top secret with additional restrictive caveats. There are protocols for sharing of intelligence between the UK and US as well as protocols for critically sensitive intelligence. The normal protocol is that shared intelligence will not be disclosed without the permission of the originator, and I do not believe that the US will allow disclosure of supplied intelligence even to an inquiry with evidence sessions behind closed doors. It is worth checking Butler, to see what was released to that inquiry, but the pattern of US co-operation with inquiries and inquests has been lamentable. It is tempting to believe that the situation may be slightly different now – seven years after the war and with an Obama administration – but I doubt it, as the culture of government secrecy always remains. So it may be very difficult to scrutinise intelligence where release is not authorised. However, it will be possible to hear evidence from intelligence and military personnel who played a role in such matter, even if the primary material is not released. These sessions may well need to be behind closed doors, but a case needs to be made to justify it. Also, by reviewing the Hutton and Butler material, some time can be saved – although there have been subsequent leaks and disclosures since these two inquiries, and these leaks are likely to continue. Another reason for closing the doors will be on issues of military operational effectiveness and personnel security – special forces personnel, details of precise equipment capabilities and operational tactics. I think these would be very limited to a few specific situations and scenarios, mainly relating to special forces operations and tactics and precise details of equipment capabilities and limitations. These should be very limited. Nevertheless, it is vital to get the issue out on the table at the start to avoid being bounced into a cover-up when it is too late.
I hope that the debate tomorrow will cover all these issues. I think – eventually – we will get the inquiry that is needed and there is the will on all sides to see it through, despite vested interests. Thankfully those vested interests are largely without power or influence and a whitewash is hopefully beyond their grasp.
Sunday, 21 June 2009
The Loathsome Shaun Woodward spinning for Blair
In the Sunday Times:
There are signs of divisions at the highest levels of government over the issue, with Shaun Woodward, the Northern Ireland Secretary, defending the initial decision to hold the inquiry in private.
Mr Woodward highlighted the example of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, into events in January 1972 in which 27 people died, which began in 2000 and has still not reported. He said that the British public would not accept an Iraq war inquiry that lasted nine years, adding that public inquiries took years to conduct and often involve judicial review.
"The public want to learn lessons and learn them fast . . . nine or ten years to get an answer is not enough," he said.
Lies and bullshit. The complexity of staging an inquiry into events some thirty-odd years ago cannot be overemphasised, especially when murder (or other) charges could result. However, this enquiry also has a well-established reputation as over-complex even considering these factors!
A public Iraq inquiry would be far more straightforward. The documents are available (probably!) and a lot of the evidence has been considered by Hutton and Butler...not all of it, and not in completeness. The boards of inquiry and inquest reports will also be available for many of the deaths in action that would need to be looked at. Hutton was run in public and under cross-examination, and nothing less will suffice for an Iraq inquiry. Blair must be cross-examined under oath in public.
If the inquiry is fixed, the legitimate conclusion will be that it has been fixed because of lobbying by Blair and Campbell who therefore have plenty to hide.
There are signs of divisions at the highest levels of government over the issue, with Shaun Woodward, the Northern Ireland Secretary, defending the initial decision to hold the inquiry in private.
Mr Woodward highlighted the example of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, into events in January 1972 in which 27 people died, which began in 2000 and has still not reported. He said that the British public would not accept an Iraq war inquiry that lasted nine years, adding that public inquiries took years to conduct and often involve judicial review.
"The public want to learn lessons and learn them fast . . . nine or ten years to get an answer is not enough," he said.
Lies and bullshit. The complexity of staging an inquiry into events some thirty-odd years ago cannot be overemphasised, especially when murder (or other) charges could result. However, this enquiry also has a well-established reputation as over-complex even considering these factors!
A public Iraq inquiry would be far more straightforward. The documents are available (probably!) and a lot of the evidence has been considered by Hutton and Butler...not all of it, and not in completeness. The boards of inquiry and inquest reports will also be available for many of the deaths in action that would need to be looked at. Hutton was run in public and under cross-examination, and nothing less will suffice for an Iraq inquiry. Blair must be cross-examined under oath in public.
If the inquiry is fixed, the legitimate conclusion will be that it has been fixed because of lobbying by Blair and Campbell who therefore have plenty to hide.
Evidence that the war was fixed from the start
A confidential record of a meeting between President Bush and Tony Blair before the invasion of Iraq, outlining their intention to go to war without a second United Nations resolution, will be an explosive issue for the official inquiry into the UK's role in toppling Saddam Hussein.
The memo, written on 31 January 2003, almost two months before the invasion and seen by the Observer, confirms that as the two men became increasingly aware UN inspectors would fail to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) they had to contemplate alternative scenarios that might trigger a second resolution legitimising military action.
Bush told Blair the US had drawn up a provocative plan "to fly U2 reconnaissance aircraft painted in UN colours over Iraq with fighter cover". Bush said that if Saddam fired at the planes this would put the Iraqi leader in breach of UN resolutions.
Reported in the Observer
A ludicrous plan anyway.....there were no-fly zones with US military aircraft operating anyway, the Iraqis would not be stupid enough to shoot down a UN plane (never heard of a U-2 operating on a UN mission - US probably wouldn't permit it) and a U-2 typically flies well above the reach of most anti-aircraft missiles.
The memo, written on 31 January 2003, almost two months before the invasion and seen by the Observer, confirms that as the two men became increasingly aware UN inspectors would fail to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) they had to contemplate alternative scenarios that might trigger a second resolution legitimising military action.
Bush told Blair the US had drawn up a provocative plan "to fly U2 reconnaissance aircraft painted in UN colours over Iraq with fighter cover". Bush said that if Saddam fired at the planes this would put the Iraqi leader in breach of UN resolutions.
Reported in the Observer
A ludicrous plan anyway.....there were no-fly zones with US military aircraft operating anyway, the Iraqis would not be stupid enough to shoot down a UN plane (never heard of a U-2 operating on a UN mission - US probably wouldn't permit it) and a U-2 typically flies well above the reach of most anti-aircraft missiles.
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