Monday 15 June 2009

Welcome to the Counter Inquiry

This blog site has been established with one purpose in mind: to counter the closed-door whitewash that the government is promoting as an Iraq War inquiry.

Now, how will this blog work? It will be a multi-user blog with informed posting and commentary from across the blogosphere. However, this blog will seek to elicit and publish information that the government wants to keep secret. One of the authors is a former Armed Forces officer who worked in a support role in advance of, and during, the Iraq War. There are plenty of Armed Forces personnel and civil servants who have retired since 2003 and who know a few things. I do not expect a smoking gun, but I do expect a very revealing jigsaw once the pieces are assembled. I encourage those in government and the Armed Forces to supply the remaining pieces of the jigsaw – ideally including the Cabinet minutes, which I pledge to post on here if leaked to myself. However, this blog needs to consider personnel and operational security and those “in the know” will know what that means: there are still troops in Afghanistan. The Official Secrets Act is for protecting secrets, not officials, despite what the government wants.

My initial comments on Not the Iraq Inquiry:

+ The NTNI should consider events since the First Gulf War of 1990, albeit with a light touch for the first half of that decade. The resolution invoked in 2003 dates from 1991.
+ Defence planning assumptions from the Defence White Paper of 1998 should be considered.
+ The sanctions regime operated by UNSCOM should be considered in detail up to the point of the withdrawal of weapons inspectors in 1998 (this will include UN reports and UK intelligence assessments)
+ The NTNI should consider the events leading up to, and surrounding Operation DESERT FOX as the prelude to what became the Iraq War
+ The regime change agenda of the US government from the inauguration of George W Bush should be considered prior to September 11 2001.
+ The strategic aims and planning assumptions for operations in Afghanistan from September 2001 should be considered in relation to the strategic aims and planning assumptions for Iraq.
+ UK and US foreign and defence policy from September 2001 onwards should be considered in detail, in particular the operations of government.
+ Intelligence assessments with regard to Iraq WMDs for the period September 2001 onwards should be considered in forensic detail, focusing on both internal government assessments and external information provision (the ‘dodgy dossiers’).
+ The legality of offensive operations against Iraq should be considered in detail.
+ The UN resolution process prior to operations in Iraq should be considered.
+ UK operational war planning (from 2002 onwards) should be considered in detail, including resourcing.
+ UK Defence logistics procurement and supply should be considered in detail for all periods of planning and operations, including pre-war UORs (urgent operational requirements).
+ Boards of Inquiry and coroners’ inquests into certain losses of lives should be considered in detail.
+ Coalition guidance to commanders on prisoner handling and the conduct of operations should be considered.

It is likely that the impartial consideration of all the above would result in conclusions including that:

+ UNSCOM monitoring was largely effective until scientists were withdrawn prior to DESERT FOX
+ Regime change in Iraq was considered by the US government prior to 2001, albeit probably as part of a “wish list.”
+ The events of September 11 2001 were identified – at some point afterwards – as a catalyst for an invasion of Iraq.
+ Operations in Afghanistan were severely disrupted by the preparations for, and the war, in Iraq and post-war occupation.
+ UK defence planning assumptions did not support the simultaneous conduct of two medium-intensity operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
+ Intelligence was selectively interpreted to justify the war, and embellished as a propaganda campaign prior to the war.
+ The decision to invade was taken at some point in June or July 2002 and operational war planning commenced shortly afterwards.
+ Gaps in equipment capability were identified as part of the war planning process.
+ UK equipment procurement and supply decisions were deferred until it was deemed politically expedient, to avoid loss of political support.
+ The conduct of military operations was as professional as would be expected in the tradition of the Armed Forces, and in line with established doctrine and tactics.
+ The conduct of military operations was limited by lack of troops and specific equipment and the difficulty of sustaining two medium-intensity operations simultaneously.
+ All UK Services – and their families - suffered from varying degrees of overstretch, which has now become endemic.
+ Planning assumptions for the occupation phase were grossly flawed – at the coalition level in particular.
+ There was little or no public support for the war other than the expected support for British personnel.
+ The war caused significant damage to the UK’s international reputation and relationships with other nations.
+ The war increased the domestic terrorism threat to the UK and this elevated level still persists.

That’s my starter for ten. Join the debate – reasoned and informed debate, pertinent information, but no tin-foil hats please: the truth is likely to be grubby enough. My nom de blog here is Veritas – those who were in uniform in 2002 will know what this means, and it also has another meaning that is desperately in need of application with regard to Iraq. Hopefully the next few weeks will see further inquiry debate and we can commence evidence sessions to mirror the actual inquiry.

5 comments:

  1. Good morning, I've just written a wee post about the Independent's headline this morning. Just in case any of Gordon Brown's hencemen happen to read it.

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  2. Veritas -

    My notes on your 'starter for ten' (14 actually) initial comments on Not the Iraq Inquiry

    (Two part post – re 4,096 character limit on posts)

    Phase I

    + The NTIWI should consider all events relating to the issues of Iraq, recent war and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iraq was at war with Iran from 1980 to 1988, initially because Iraq under Saddam Hussein militarily seized the entirety of the Shatt al Arab waterway. Iraq thereafter extensively used WMD in the forms of mustard gas and nerve agent against both, to defend against Iranian territorial advances and to forcefully subdue its own Kurdish minority population. Iraq later failed to notify UNSCOM, UNMOVIC or anyone else that it had used WMD against Iran, and this led to the belief that as many as 6500 chemical bombs containing a potential 1000 tons of chemical agents still existed in Iraq. This non-disclosure, amongst other omissions, led to Iraq being found to be in material breach of a long series of United Nations resolutions stretching from 1990 to 2002.

    In 1990 Iraq forcefully seized Kuwait, and was thereafter ejected by UN-authorized Coalition forces in early 1991. The final disposition of other WMD items dating to that era was never comprehensively established, similarly causing material breach of UN resolutions.

    (It is likely that only a light touch of inquiry would be required for the first decade of the period to be examined, i.e. before 1990.)

    + The sanctions regime operated by UNSCOM should be considered in detail from their outset, through the point of the withdrawal of weapons inspectors in 1998, to their formal ending on May 22, 2003 (this will include UN reports and UK intelligence assessments). It is now a demonstrable argument (including in recent Iraqi belief) that the international sanctions policy was not ever going to be lifted short of Iraqi regime change in Baghdad. This in turn led to Iraqi intransigence concerning its disclosures and its communications with UN weapons inspection authorities.

    + The NTIWI should consider the events leading up to, and surrounding Operation DESERT FOX as the prelude to what became the Iraq War. Attention must be paid to former-UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler’s letters and statements to the Security Council in respect of documentation that was not provided by the Iraqi authorities, and to forensic examination of Scud missile warhead samples which led to claims of VX contamination.

    + The regime change agenda of the United States presidency (and government) should be considered. This will include events and documents dating from the inauguration of George W Bush on January 20, 2001, and both prior to and following September 11, 2001. Particular attention should be given to Paragraph 10 of National Security Directive 54, as signed by George H W Bush on January 15, 1991.

    + Intelligence assessments with regard to Iraq WMD for the period of UNSCOM, UNMOVIC and ISG reporting should be considered in forensic detail, focusing on both external and internal government assessments, and on external PR information provision (the ‘dodgy dossiers’). Previous UK inquiries have looked at many aspects of Iraq’s WMD programmes, but only did so with limited terms of reference. An overall UK assessment has not been forthcoming and this inquiry will aim to correct this deficiency.

    + The UN resolution process prior to the 2003 operations in Iraq should be considered. The resolutions invoked in the legal advise of 2003 included Res. 678 (1990), Res. 687 (1991) and Res. 1441 (2002), these are of particular importance.

    + The legality of offensive operations against Iraq should be considered in detail. Especial interest will be found in various analysis of Lord Goldsmith’s two-part March 7 and March 17, 2003 legal advice to then-PM Tony Blair.

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  3. Phase II

    + UK and US foreign and defence policy in relation to Iraq from January 1990 onwards should be considered in detail, in particular the operations of government and the conduct of relationships with other members of the UN; and with the UN itself.

    + UK operational war planning (from August 1990 onwards) should be considered in detail on a comparative basis, including governmental resourcing and funding in relation to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.

    + Defence planning assumptions beginning with the Defence White Paper of 1998 should be discussed. NBC defence considerations will be an important part of this discussion.

    + The strategic aims and planning assumptions for multinational operations in Afghanistan from September 2001 should be considered in relation to the strategic aims of regime removal and replacement and for post-war planning assumptions for Iraq by the US/UK authorities.

    + UK Defence (MoD) logistics procurement and supply should be considered in detail for all periods of planning and operations, including pre-war UORs (urgent operational requirements).

    + Coalition guidance to commanders on prisoner handling and the conduct of operations should be considered. Information gained from the handling and debriefing of ‘high value’ detainees should be more completely assessed.

    + Boards of Inquiry and coroners’ inquests into certain losses of lives should be considered with great sympathy and genuine concern for all affected persons.

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  4. Just re-read post - I messed up - the second sentence of the first post should read: Iraq thereafter extensively used WMD in the forms of mustard gas and nerve agent both to defend against Iranian territorial advances and to forcefully subdue its own Kurdish minority population.

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